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You had something to hide, should have hidden it shouldn’t you. Now 
you’re not satisfied, with what you’re being put through. It’s just time 
to pay the price, for not listening to advice, and deciding in your 
youth on the Policy of Truth. Things could be so different now, it used 
to be so civilized. You will always wonder how it could have been if 
you’d only lied. It’s too late to change events it’s time to face the 
consequence for delivering the proof in the Policy of Truth. Never 
again is what you swore, the time before. Now you’re standing there 
tongue tied, you’d better learn your lesson well, hide what you have 
to hide, and tell what you have to tell. You’ll see your problems 
multiplied, if you continually decide, to faithfully pursue the Policy 
of Truth.- Policy of Truth by Depeche Mode.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Fifteen years before Depeche Mode’s 1990 single, “Policy of 
Truth,” the Khmer Rouge, under its leader Pol Pot, committed a 
devastating genocide against the people of Cambodia.  From 1975 to 
1979, a period known then as Democratic Kampuchea,2 the Khmer 
Rouge savagely and brutally killed an estimated 1.5 million to 3 million 
people.3  Comparatively, in Rwanda, and four years after Depeche 
Mode’s single, the Hutus killed more than 800,000 Rwandans over a 
                                                          
1.  DEPECHE MODE, Policy of Truth, in VIOLATOR  (Mute Records 1990) 
[hereinafter Policy of Truth]. 
2.  KHAMBOLY DY, A HISTORY OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (1975–1979) 1 
(2007).  
3.  Henri Locard, State Violence in Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979) and 
Retribution (1979-2004), 12(1) EUR. REV. HIST. 121, 121 (2005).  
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100-day period in 1994.4  The death toll constituted approximately 70% 
to 80% of the Tutsi population,5 and 33% of the Pygmy Batwa.6 
These tragic events in human history, similar in their senseless and 
reprehensible killing of innocent people, generated different 
mechanisms to address the devastation left behind by the respective 
genocides.  Cambodia created the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”),7 a traditional and formal tribunal 
system adhering to international law and jurisdiction.  Conversely, 
Rwanda opted for a community based, non-traditional format.  In 2001, 
the Rwandan government instituted the Gacaca court8 to accommodate 
the hundreds of thousands of people accused of acts of genocide and 
crimes against humanity.9  Additionally, the Gacaca was established 
not only to convict and punish those responsible for the genocide, but 
also as a tool of transitional justice to further community healing and 
rebuilding.10 
Various sectors of the international community have recently 
discussed the role of transitional justice to address these atrocities. 
Transitional justice is a combination of judicial and non-judicial 
measures used to combat systemic human rights atrocities.11  Some 
transitional justice methods include, criminal prosecutions, truth 
commissions, reparations programs, and various kinds of institutional 
                                                          
4.  See, e.g., Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC NEWS, May 17, 2011, 
at 1, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13431486. 
5.  PHILIP VERWIMP, A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF GENOCIDE IN KIBUYE 
PREFECTURE 8 (2001).  
6.  See Raja Sheshadri, Pygmies in the Congo Basin and Conflict, ICE CASE 
STUD. 163 (2005), http://mandalaprojects.com/ice/ice-cases/pygmy.htm.  
7.  Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed 
During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Cambodia-UN, June 6, 2003, 2329 
U.N.T.S. 117; see also G.A. Res. 57/228, Khmer Rouge Trials, at 2–3 (May 22, 2003) 
(approving the establishment of the ECCC). 
8.  Lars Waldorf, Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Rethinking Local Justice as 
Transitional Justice, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 50 (2006) (Gacaca loosely translates into 
“justice amongst the grass”).  
9.  Id. at 2.  
10.  See Mark Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to 
Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1261 (2000). 
11.  What is Transitional Justice?, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., 
https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
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reforms.12  They can be seen in a variety of formations, from the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa,13 to the Good Friday 
Agreement in Ireland,14 and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.15 
Transitional justice is implemented when a political system 
transitions from a regime of violence and repression to a peaceful and 
stable society.16  However, transitional justice movements are directly 
related to a society’s treatment during and after the regime change.17 
Transitional justice can serve to rebuild government trust, and repair 
political systems that are severely damaged.  Overall, these movements 
“comprise[] the full range of processes and mechanisms” to attain a 
more peaceful, certain, and democratic future.18  As utopian as 
transitional justice sounds for countries plagued with atrocities of 
genocide and crimes against humanity, scholars and analysts have 
raised concerns regarding its implementation.  The most prevalent 
criticism is directed at its most utilized and prominent form: trials. 
Makau W. Mutua, a Kenyan-American legal scholar, commented 
on the International Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) and argued “the 
Rwanda Tribunal, no matter how successful it becomes, will never 
compensate for the inaction of the international community as the 
genocide took place in 1994.”19  Furthermore, former investigator for 
the United Nations Security Council’s Commission of Experts on 
Rwanda, Lyal S. Sunga, argues criminal prosecutions and truth 
commissions, as currently established, are conflicting; thus, preventing 
each other from properly carrying out their objectives.20  Mr. Sunga 
                                                          
12.  Id. 
13.  See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (S. 
Afr.).  
14.  See Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, 37 
I.L.M. 751.  
15.  S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000). 
16.  Lisa J. Laplante & Kelly Phenicie, Mediating Post-Conflict Dialogue: The 
Media’s Role in Transitional Justice Processes, 93 MARQ. L. Rev. 251, 254 (2009).  
17.  See id. at 253. 
18.  U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).  
19.  Makau Matua, Never Again: Questioning the Yugoslav and Rwanda 
Tribunals, 11 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 167, 183 (1997). 
20.  See Lyal S. Sunga, Ten Principles for Reconciling Truth Commissions and 
Criminal Prosecutions, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
4
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argues truth commissions must be established under international 
human rights and criminal law to avoid conflicting and undermining 
criminal prosecutions by granting blanket amnesties to offenders of 
serious crimes.21  Instead, criminal prosecutions should be focused on 
human rights victims, so the government’s actions are placed in a 
proper perspective.22 
Given these concerns and critiques, the debate within transitional 
justice revolves around what aspect to pursue initially: justice or 
peace.23  Those emphasizing justice assert that if those accused of 
human rights violations are not prosecuted, the impunity for crimes will 
transition into the incoming regime, thereby preventing a complete 
transition away from the conflict.24  However, those advocating for 
peace assert the only way to efficiently end violence is through gaining 
the truth via reconciliation and granting amnesties.25  The stark reality 
is that the method of transitional justice utilized is a subjective decision, 
which varies from state to state. The sequence of implementing 
transitional justice measures directly “depends on time and the 
historical context of the conflict.”26  Accordingly, Cambodia and 
Rwanda have implemented different trial functions to implement 
transitional justice. The international community can learn lessons 
about both systems as well as other international tribunals by comparing 
these two different examples of transitional justice measures. 
This Comment attempts to understand the positive and negative 
impacts both systems have had in forwarding transition justice.  Part I 
of this Comment analyzes the Gacaca Court system and outlines the 
Court’s formation, structure, and procedures.  Part II discusses the 
                                                          
COURT (2009) [hereinafter “Ten Principles”]; TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF 
TRUTH COMMISSIONS (Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000). 
21.  See generally Ten Principles, supra note 20.  
22.  See LYAL SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 102–03 (1992).   
23.  See Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
69 (2003).  
24.  See id. at 78–81.  
25.  Ten Principles, supra note 20.  
26.  Anja Mihr & Chandra Lekha Sriram, Rule of Law, Security and Transitional 
Justice in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Societies, at 2 (Comm’n on Glob. Sec. Just. 
& Gov. Background Paper 2015), 
https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/Commission_BP_Mihr_Sriram.pdf.  
5
Theiring: The Policy of Truth: A Comparative Study of Transitional Justice
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2017
Theiringcamera ready (Do Not Delete) 6/20/2018  11:11 AM 
164 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48 
ECCC and analyzes the formation, structure, and procedures, while 
comparing and contrasting them to the Gacaca Court.  Part III details 
the successes and failures of both court systems to evaluate if one 
system is preferential to the other to forward transitional justice.  
Finally, Part IV explains how those lessons can be applied in other 
transitional justice systems. 
I. RWANDA AND THE GACACA COURT 
A. Formation 
While the Gacaca Court was initially established in 2001 as a means 
to mitigate the massive number of Rwandans accused of crimes that 
forwarded the genocide in 1994, the history of the Gacaca is rooted 
several hundreds of years prior.27  During pre-colonial Rwanda in the 
seventeenth century, Kings, known as Mwami, ruled various sectors 
encompassing several households within an extended lineage.28  The 
Mwami embodied justice and power and, as such, were seen as the 
ultimate judge, jury, and executioner.29  However, before the Mwami 
would hear any dispute, a group of wise men, referred to as the Gacaca, 
would hear the matter first to restore peace and tranquility within 
communities.30  The Gacaca would recognize and acknowledge the 
wrongs committed and summarily restored justice to the victims.31  
Once the colonization of Rwanda initiated, the western systems of law 
and order engulfed the culture, and the newly established courts 
eventually phased out the Gacaca as a means to settle disputes.32 
                                                          
27.  Maya Goldstein Bolocan, Rwandan Gacaca: An Experiment in Transitional 
Justice, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 355, 375 (2004).  
28.  Bert Ingelaere, The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, in TRADITIONAL JUSTICE 
AND RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENCE CONFLICT: LEARNING FROM AFRICAN 
EXPERIENCES 25, 33 (2008).  
29.  Id.  
30.  Luc Huyse et al., Traditional Justice and Reconciliation after Violent 
Conflict, at 33, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE (2008), 
https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/traditional-justice-and-
reconciliation-after-violent-conflict-learning-from-african-experiences_0.pdf. The 
term “Gacaca” is derived from the Kinyarwanda word “unucaca,” meaning “a plant 
so soft to sit on that people prefer to gather on it.” Id.  
31.  Id. at 33–34.  
32.  Id. at 34.  
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At the conclusion of the Rwandan genocide, Rwanda’s 
transitioning leaders faced the difficult position of having to prosecute 
approximately 130,000 alleged participants of the genocide.33  The 
initial method to provide justice to the victims of the Rwandan genocide 
was the creation of the ICTR.34  However, given the vast amount of 
accused, the ICTR needed a system to mitigate the insufficient 
resources to establish First World courts as well as give local 
communities closure and the ability to confront the trauma suffered 
from the genocide.35  The Gacaca court was re-implemented, like a 
phoenix rising from the ashes of the Rwanda’s historic traditions and 
culture.  With the rebirth of the Gacaca system, several goals were 
established within the Court’s implementation: “[1] establish truth 
about what happened; [2] accelerate the legal proceedings for those 
accused of genocide crimes; [3] eradicate the culture of impunity; [4] 
reconcile Rwandans and reinforce their unity; and [5] use the capacities 
of Rwandan society to deal with its problems through a justice-based 
Rwandan custom.”36 
B. Structure 
The Gacaca’s structure was based on a system of individual cells 
and sectors.37 Each individual cell makes up a small community, and a 
small group of cells comprise a sector, which constitutes “a village.”38  
Within the dichotomy of the Gacaca system, there are 9,013 cells and 
1,545 sectors,39 comprising 12,013 individual Gacaca courts 
                                                          
33.  Filip Reyntjens & Stef Vandegiste, Rwanda: An Atypical Transition, in 
ROADS TO RECONCILIATION 110 (2005).   
34.  S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).  
35.  See Outreach Programme On The Rwanda Genocide, Background 
Information on the Justice and Reconciliation Process in Rwanda (Mar. 2014), 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgjustice.shtml (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2018). 
36.  Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 38.  
37.  Alexandra A. Miller, From the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
to the International Criminal Court: Expanding the Definition of Genocide to Include 
Rape, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 349, 352 n.29  (2003).  
38.  Id.  
39.  Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 41.  
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established nationwide as of April 2009.40 Gacaca court began as a 
nineteen presiding judges, which make up the council, and has since 
reduced to five elected judges known as Inyangamugayo.41  During 
2005 and 2006, data and information was collected from the accused in 
all of the Gacaca cells.42  After the initial data collection process was 
complete, there were 818,564 Rwandans accused of some crime 
relating to the genocide, of which 44,204 were not in the country, and 
87,063 were deceased.43 
C. Categories of Crimes 
At this stage, the Gacaca separated those accused into four distinct 
categories: 1, 2 (1st and 2nd degree), 2 (3rd degree), and 3 (4th and 5th 
degree).44  These categories were generated to classify the accused into 
distinct categories based on the severity of their alleged crime and 
provide the Gacaca with sentencing guidelines.45  The amount the 
sentence could be decreased depended on whether the accused 
confessed before or after they appeared on the list of suspects.46 
Category 1, the most severe, was reserved for those who “occupied 
positions of leadership, rapists, well-known murderers, torturers, or any 
people who committed dehumanizing acts on a body.”47  Under this 
category, due to the severity of the charges and punishments dispensed, 
                                                          
40.  1994 Genocide: Gacaca Trials Discharge One Million Cases So Far, 
JUSTICE INFO.NET (Apr. 3, 2009), https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/component/k2/ 
21257-en-en-030409-rwandagenocide-1994-genocide-gacaca-trials-discharge-one-
million-cases-so-far1206412064.html. 
41.  Hollie Nyseth Brehm, Christopher Uggen, & Jean-Damascene Gasanabo, 
Genocide, Justice, and Rwanda’s Courts, 30 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 333, 337 
(2014); see also NICOLAS A. JONES, THE COURTS OF GENOCIDE: POLITICS AND THE 
RULE OF LAW IN RWANDA AND ARUSHA (2010). The word “Inyangamugayo” is the 
Kinyarwanda word for a reliable or trustworthy person. Id. 
42.  PHIL CLARK & ZACHARY D. KAUFMAN, AFTER GENOCIDE 13 (2008).  
43.  Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 42. 
44.  Id. at 40.  
45.  See id. at 39.  
46.  Anne N. Kubai, Between Justice and Reconciliation: The Survivors of 
Rwanda, 16(1) AFR. SEC. REV. 53, 60 (2007).  
47.  Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 40; see also Anuradha Chakravarty, Gacaca 
Courts in Rwanda: Explaining Divisions within the Human Rights Community, YALE 
J. INT’L AFF. 134 (2006).  
8
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those accused of Category 1 crimes would be addressed in either the 
ordinary court or the ICTR.48  Category 2 (1st and 2nd degree) was 
reserved for “[o]rdinary killers in serious attacks and those who 
committed attacks in order to kill but without attaining this goal.”49  The 
Sector Gacaca holds jurisdiction and could render a sentence ranging 
from twenty to thirty years, with no confession, or from seven to twelve 
years, with a confession prior to their appearance.50  Category 2 (3rd 
Degree) comprised of those who attacked others without the intention 
to kill.51  The Sector Gacaca also addressed the accused in this category, 
imposing a sentence of five to seven years, without a confession, or one 
to three years, with a confession prior to their appearance.52  Finally, 
Category 3 (4th and 5th Degree) accused were charged with property 
damage and were adjudicated by the Cell Gacaca, in which the only 
punishment allowed—regardless of confession—was civil reparation.53 
After March 2007, the Categories were adjusted to allow the 
Gacaca courts to generate judicial economy for the ICTR as well as gain 
more closure for the victims of some of the most brutal atrocities.54  
This was accomplished by shifting well-known murderers, torturers, 
and those committing dehumanizing acts on a dead body to be tried 
under what would now be deemed Category 2 (1st, 2nd, and 3rd 
degree).55  In addition, a new Category 2 (4th and 5th degree) replaced 
the former Category 2 (1st and 2nd degree) category.56  Furthermore, a 
new Category 2 (6th degree) replaced the original Category 2 (3rd 
degree).57  Category 3 remained unaltered.58  After all of the 
                                                          
48.  Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 40; see also Chakravarty, supra note 47, at 134. 
49.  Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 40 
50.  L. Danielle Tully, Human Rights Compliance and the Gacaca Jurisdictions 
in Rwanda, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 385, 400–01 (2003). 
51.  Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 40; see also Chakravarty, supra note 47, at 134. 
52.  Tully, supra note 50, at 400–01; see also Chakravarty, supra note 47, at 
134. 
53.  Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 40. 
54.  Id. at 40–41, 43; see generally Leo C. Nwoye, Partners or Rivals in 
Reconciliation? The ICTR and Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, 16 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
124 (2014).  
55.  Ingelaere, supra note 28, at 41. 
56.  Id. 
57.  Id. 
58.  Id.  
9
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information was disseminated, it was determined Category 1 would 
adjudicate over 77,269 accused, Category 2 contained 432,557, and 
Category 3 was comprised of 308,739 accused.59 
D. Procedural Methods and Problems 
Unlike the Gacaca proceedings during the time of the Mwami, the 
new procedures embodied many attributes of Rwanda’s western 
colonial influences.  The Gacaca court of the past was focused on being 
restorative and conciliatory, whereas the modern Gacaca was altered in 
design and practice.60  The alteration that has come about, aside from 
the council of Inyangamugayo presiding over the court, is that much of 
the subjective procedural methods utilized during the trial process are 
not consistent with traditional Rwandan or international law.61 
For example, the accused do not have the right to counsel nor the 
right to confront their accusers.62  This aspect plays a significant role in 
the Gacaca Court’s ability to collect evidence.  During pre-trial, the 
court is able to compile dossiers on the accused, including input from 
the community.63  The dossiers are then corroborated before their 
introduction to the Gacaca.64 Without a right to be present during the 
pre-trial phase, coupled with the defendant’s lack of counsel, the trial 
proceedings are heavily weighted against the accused.65  However, 
during the pre-trial phase, the accused are afforded a chance to put 
                                                          
59.  Id. at 42. 
60.  Waldorf, supra note 8, at 50. 
61.  Chakravarty, supra note 47, at 132, 135. 
62.  Jennie E. Burnet, The Injustice of Local Justice: Truth, Reconciliation, and 
Revenge in Rwanda, 3 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 173, 176 (2008). Although 
the Rwandan Constitution, the Rwandan Code of Criminal Procedure, and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognize the accused’s “right to 
be informed of the accusations against him or her and the right to have sufficient time 
to prepare a defense,” Gacaca courts have not always respected those rights. Kenneth 
Roth, Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community-Based Gacaca 
Courts, at 34, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 31, 2011), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/05/31/justice-compromised/legacy-rwandas-
community-based-gacaca-courts. 
63.  Chakravarty, supra note 47, at 135. 
64.  Id. 
65.  Id.; see also Amnesty International, Rwanda: Gacaca—Gambling with 
Justice (June 20, 2002), http://web.amnesty.org/library/ index/ENGAFR470032002. 
10
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forward evidence to the community.66 During this stage, “and even later 
on in the information gathering period, witnesses are able to testify for 
or against defendants.”67 
Once the trial is underway, the defendant is then informed of the 
charges, and at such time, is allowed to present his case.68  As a matter 
of procedure, the council allows the defendant to provide additional 
testimony if he feels the record is incomplete in some form.69  
Furthermore, the defendant is allowed to challenge the category of the 
crime of which he is accused.70 
However, many defendants do not challenge their category because 
they have been accused of crimes they committed alongside family 
members or close neighbors and do not want to point the finger at other 
accused, which is required by the confession process.71  During trial, 
the council must discuss and analyze inconsistent testimonies from 
primary suspects, accomplices, and witnesses, which can take up to 
three years.72  Additionally, the sentence may be appealed to a Gacaca 
appeals court, “sometimes moving all the way up the national court 
system.”73 
                                                          
66.  Chakravarty, supra note 47, at 135.  
67.  Id.; see also Jeevan Vasagar, Grassroots Justice, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 
2005, 9:18 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/mar/17 
/worlddispatch.rwanda.  
68.  Roth, supra note 62, at 34. “[M]any accused did not receive the legally 
prescribed notice of cases pending against them, were not provided with sufficient 
pre-trial information about the charges against them, and were not given enough time 
to prepare their defenses. Many accused only learned of the real nature of the 
allegations against them on the day of their trial. The inability of the accused to 
involve a lawyer only aggravated these problems.” Id.  
69.  Id.  
70. Monitoring and Research Report on the Gacaca: Testimonies and Evidence 
in the Gacaca Courts, at 32, PENAL REFORM INST., https://www.penalreform.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/Gacaca-Report-11-testimony-and-evidence-1.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
71.  Id. 
72.  Charlotte Hulme, The Truth Heals: Punishment and Reconciliation at 
Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts, at 10–11, Honor Thesis Collection (2014), 
http://repository.wellesley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1250&context=thesiscoll
ection.  
73.  Id.  
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Although these aspects of the Gacaca courts seem to be a proper 
foundation for the establishment of a system rooted in transitional 
justice, there are various critics that believe that the Gacaca courts are 
stifling the progress of true transitional justice. Aside from the 
previously mentioned deficiency in the lack of defendant’s rights, 
allegations of corruption have been forwarded against the 
Inyangamugayo.74  Since the Inyangamugayo are unpaid, the incidents 
of bribery and corruption have been a continued source of contention 
for the Gacaca system as a whole.75  As an extension of this concern, 
the level of competency of those chosen as Inyangamugayo has been a 
source of criticism of the Gacaca’s ability to dispense effective 
justice.76  The Inyangamugayo are not placed into their position for 
their intricate level of knowledge in the law, but rather their status as 
“people of integrity.”77  Training for both the Inyangamugayo and the 
“lawyers” within the Gacaca has been minimal at best.78  As a 
byproduct of the Inyangamugayo’s lack of payment and training, the 
Office of the Prosecutor lends a disproportionate amount of support 
towards the judiciary.79  As a result, the prosecution has been given a 
considerable amount of weight to their side, which creates an unlevel 
playing field for those accused.80 
II. THE EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA 
A.  Formation 
In 1997, “the former First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh and 
then Second Prime Minister Hun Sen” of Cambodia appealed to the 
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to establish a special 
                                                          
74.  Rwanda: Mixed Legacy for Community-Based Genocide Courts, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/31/rwanda-mixed-legacy-community-
based-genocide-courts (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
75.  Jacqueline Lewis, Mass Graves and a Thousand Hills: University Student 
Perspectives on the Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda, at 5, INQUIRY J. 
(2010). 
76.  Burnet, supra note 62, at 175. 
77.  Id. 
78.  Lewis, supra note 75, at 3.  
79.  Vasagar, supra note 67. 
80.  Id.  
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tribunal in Cambodia.81  The purpose of the tribunal was to bring justice 
for the millions of individuals who suffered under the senior leadership 
of the Khmer Rouge regime.82  After several years of negotiations 
between Cambodia and the United Nations, an agreement was 
established on May 22, 2003, and was summarily endorsed by the 
United Nations General Assembly.83  With an agreement in place, 
Cambodia established the Khmer Rouge Trial Task Force (“Task 
Force”).84  This Task Force created both legal and judicial institutions 
to address the additional war criminals.85  Meanwhile, the Cambodian 
government stated it would only be able to contribute limited funding 
because of its own deficient economic state and other prior 
commitments.86  As a result, several nations including, Canada, Japan, 
and India all made significant contributions.87  Despite the additional 
contributions, as of January 2006, there was insufficient funding to 
establish the tribunal.88 
Despite the lack of funding, two months later, United Nations 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan nominated seven judges to the 
                                                          
81.  Kathern M. Klein, Bringing the Khmer Rouge to Justice: The Challenges 
and Risks Facing the Joint Tribunal in Cambodia, 4 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 549, 554 
(2006). For the past 30 years, Hun Sen has served as Cambodia’s First Prime Minster 
and has been able to keep his position even when the regime changed from King 
Nordom Sihanouk to his son, and current King, Nordom Sihamoni. Stephanie Giry, 
Autopsy of a Cambodia Election: How Hun Sen Rules, 94 FOREIGN AFF. 144, 146 
(2015).  
82.  Daniel Kemper Donovan, Joint U.N.-Cambodia Efforts to Establish a 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 551, 551 (2003). 
83.  See generally, G.A. Res. 57/228 B (May 22, 2003).  
84.  See Teresa V. Capeleto, Reconciliation in the Wake of Tragedy: 
Cambodia’s Extraordinary Chambers Undermines the Cambodian Constitution, 17 
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 103, 109 (2008). 
85.  Id. 
86.  See Alison Kamhi, Private Funding for Public Justice: The Feasibility of 
Donations to the Cambodian Tribunal, 48 HARV. INT’L L. J. 581, 581–82 (2007). 
87.   Id. at 584. Nearly three dozen countries contributed to the formation of the 
ECCC, including loans from the United Nations. For an exhaustive list of the countries 
and the amounts they donated, see Documentation Center of Cambodia, List of 
Pledging Donor Countries for U.N. Share for Establishment of Extraordinary 
Chambers, 
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/Financial_Outlook_31%20_January_%2
02015.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
88.  Kamhi, supra note 86, at 584.  
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tribunal.89  As May 2006 approached, King Norodom Sihamoni 
approved seventeen judges from Cambodia and thirteen international 
officials to preside over the tribunals.90  All of the chosen justices were 
officially sworn in to serve on the tribunal in July 2006.91  However, 
over the following years, staff has worked without pay and has even 
“gone on strike following severe funding shortfalls.”92  As a result of 
the lack of funding, the U.N. General Assembly has been forced to grant 
the ECCC funding to ensure staff was paid.93 
B.  Structure 
Regarding the structure, the tribunal consisted of a combination of 
local and international judges.94  There are three separate chambers: 
Pre-Trial Chamber, Trial Chamber, and the Supreme Court Chamber.95  
First, the Pre-Trial Chamber hears motions from Investigating Justices 
                                                          
89.  Judges Nominated, THE PHNOM PENH POST. (Mar. 10, 2006, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/judges-nominated. 
90.  King Approves List of Judges for KR Trial, THE CAMBODIA DAILY (May 9, 
2006), https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/king-approves-list-of-judges-for-
kr-trial-54020/. The international officials included officials from Australia, Austria, 
Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Poland, Sri Lanka, and the 
United States.  
91.  Judges sworn in for Khmer Rouge, BBC NEWS (last updated July 3, 2006, 
9:02 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5140032.stm.   
92.  Beth Van Schaack, The Building Blocks of Hybrid Justice, 44 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 169, 276 (2016). 
93.  Id.; see also U.N. Secretary-General, Request for a Subvention to the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, U.N. Doc. A/69/536 (Oct. 20, 
2014).  
94.  Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea, ECCC (Oct. 27, 2004), 
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-
documents/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf [hereinafter Law on the 
ECCC]. 
95.  See Judicial Chambers, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF 
CAMBODIA, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/organs/judicial-chambers (last visited Mar. 
25, 2018). Both the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers are comprised of “three Cambodian 
judges and two international judges;” whereas the Supreme Court Chamber contains 
“four Cambodian judges and three international judges.” U.N. Secretary-General, 
Report of the Secretary-General on Khmer Rouge Trials, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/57/769 
(Mar. 31, 2003). 
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who are assigned to cases with the specific purpose of determining if 
the case will go to trial through the submission of a closing order.96  If 
the case moves forward, the Trial Chamber will hear and decide the 
case.97  Finally, the Supreme Court Chamber is able to hear appeals 
from the Trial Chamber.98  The Supreme Council of the Magistracy of 
Cambodia determines the panel of international justices, which is 
selected from a pool of nominations from the United Nations Secretary-
General.99  The judges retain their appointments until the entire tribunal 
has completed.100 
C.  Administrative Divisions of the Court 
1.  Support for the Victims During the Process 
Aside from actual litigation component of the tribunal, there is a 
separate division within the ECCC dedicated specifically to address the 
issues suffered by the Khmer Rouge’s victims.  The Victims Support 
Section (“VSS”) is an intermediary between the victims, or their 
appointed representatives, and the ECCC.101  Victims are provided a 
variety of services and assistance from the VSS through different facets 
                                                          
96.  Office of the Co-Investigating Judges, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE 
COURT OF CAMBODIA, https://web.archive.org/web/20110610105051/ 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/ocij (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).  
97.  Id. 
98.  Report of the Secretary-General on Khmer Rouge Trials, supra note 95, at 
¶ 16; see also Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules 
(Rev. 1), Rule 23 (Feb. 1, 2008), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/cabinet/ 
fileUpload/27/Internal_Rules_ Revision1_01-02-08_eng.pdf [hereinafter ECCC 
Internal Rules].  
99.  Ernestine E. Meijer, The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia for Prosecuting Crimes Committed by the Khmer Rouge: Jurisdiction, 
Organization, and Procedure of an Internationalized National Tribunal, in 
INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST 
TIMOR, KOSOVO, & CAMBODIA 207, 221 (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2004). 
100.  Id. 
101.  The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), CTR. 
FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY, http://cja.org/what-we-do/litigation/khmer-rouge-
trials/related-resources/the-extraordinary-chambers-in-the-courts-of-cambodia-
eccc/?id=454 (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).  
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of the tribunal process.102  For example, victims can gain support from 
the VSS by directly becoming a part of the proceedings, whether it be 
in the role of a complainant or a civil party.103  In addition, the VSS is 
charged with the duty of notifying victims about the rights they are 
guaranteed during the tribunal as well as providing victims with legal 
counsel if they require it.104  Because of the functions of the VSS, 
victims have been given formal recognition as a party to the 
proceedings; thereby, becoming eligible for either individual or 
collective damages caused by the genocide.105  In addition to providing 
logistical assistance, the VSS is charged with the security and 
protection of all the participants during the course of the proceedings.106  
This can take two forms: (1) providing actual physical security for those 
providing testimony to the ECCC or (2) counseling and psychiatric 
care.107  However, even in 2008, the ECCC “lacked even minimal 
capacity to educate the public or to provide security or support to 
victims and civil parties.”108 
2.  Access to Legal Counsel for Defendants 
Aside from the judiciary, there are several other departments within 
the ECCC that seek to facilitate the processes of the tribunal and 
provide direct support to certain areas within the trial process.  One such 
division of the ECCC is the Defense Support Section (“DSS”).  The 
DSS is responsible for several functions within the ECCC, which 
include, providing indigent defendants with a choice of attorneys; 
providing support services for the attorneys advocating for the defense; 
                                                          
102.  Victims Support Section, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURT OF 
CAMBODIA, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/victims-support (last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
103.  Id.  
104.  Id. 
105.  Renee Jeffery, Beyond Repair?: Collective and Moral Reparations at the 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal, 13 J. HUM. RTS. 103, 106 (2014).  
106.  James P. Bair, From the Numbers Who Died to Those Who Survived: 
Victim Participation in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 31 
U. HAW. L. REV. 507, 532 (2009). 
107.  See, e.g., ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 98, Rule 23. 
108.  Bair, supra note 106, at 532.  
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and actively pursuing the continued usage of fair trial practices.109  
Furthermore, the DSS acts as the voice within the media for those 
accused.110 
Additionally, the DSS has an additional component known as the 
Legacy Program.111  The Legacy Program serves a two-fold purpose 
within the structure of the ECCC.  First, the Legacy Program is utilized 
to further the understanding of individuals within Cambodia about the 
criminal trial process as well as their right to a fair trial and defense.112  
The second purpose is to give Cambodian judges and lawyers the 
opportunity to obtain valuable exposure to international law.113  The 
intent of these goals is to foster an environment where concrete 
improvements can be integrated within the Cambodian legal system; 
thereby, expanding the Cambodian courts’ viability and capability to 
address future concerns as they progress.114 
3.  A Central Office that Provides Support and Stability 
Finally, there is the Office of Administration contained within the 
ECCC that handles a variety of day-to-day operations.115 This includes 
everything from budget and financing, to the Court Management Office 
that provides audio, visual, and translation services, as well as a Public 
Affairs Office.116  All of these various offices and departments provide 
the ECCC with the ability to provide support and modern legal services 
                                                          
109.  See Defence Support Section (DSS), EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE 
COURT OF CAMBODIA, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/organs/defence-support-section 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2018). 
110.  Id. 
111.  Alice Murgier, The Legacy of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia: Why Defense Work is Essential in Shaping the Historical Narrative of 
the Court, CAMBODIA TRIBUNAL MONITOR (Sept. 16, 2016), 
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/2016/09/16/the-legacy-of-the-eccc-why-defense-
work-is-essential-in-shaping-the-historical-narrative-of-the-court/.  
112.  See id. 
113.  See U.N. Off. of the High Comm., Promotion of ECCC Legacy (Sept. 28, 
2015), http://cambodia.ohchr.org/en/rule-of-law/promotion-eccc-legacy.  
114.  Id. 
115.  Office of Administration, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURT OF 
CAMBODIA, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/organs/office-administration (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2018).  
116.  Id. 
17
Theiring: The Policy of Truth: A Comparative Study of Transitional Justice
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2017
Theiringcamera ready (Do Not Delete) 6/20/2018  11:11 AM 
176 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48 
to maintain a solid working structure throughout the course of the 
tribunal. 
D.  Procedural Methods 
Turning towards the manner in which the ECCC dispenses justice, 
we first look to the jurisdiction of the ECCC, and what crimes it is 
charged with adjudicating.  The ECCC currently retains jurisdiction 
over several domestic and international crimes.117  These include 
crimes committed between 1975 and 1979 that violate the 1956 Penal 
Code of Cambodia,118 the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,119 the Geneva Conventions (war 
crimes),120 the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,121 the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations,122 and general crimes against humanity.123  If 
someone brought before the ECCC is found guilty, they can be 
sentenced to imprisonment and additionally have their property 
                                                          
117.  Law of ECCC, supra note 94. 
118.  Id. art. 3. 
119.  Id. art. 4. See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Punishment and Prevention 
of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, S. Exec. Doc. O, 81-1, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 
120.  Law of ECCC, supra note 94, art. 6. See, e.g., Geneva Convention (I) for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6. U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention (II) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva 
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
121.  Law of ECCC, supra note 94, art. 7. See, e.g., Hague Convention on the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 
U.N.T.S. 240. 
122.  Law of ECCC, supra note 94, art. 8. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. 
123.  Law of ECCC, supra note 94, art. 5. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. Crimes against 
humanity are specific “acts [] committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” Id. These 
crimes include, inter alia, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible 
transfer of population, imprisonment, torture, rape, enforced disappearance, apartheid, 
and “other inhuman acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, 
or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” Id. 
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forfeited.124  Furthermore, in keeping with international humanitarian 
law and the tradition of other United Nations tribunals, the ECCC lacks 
the ability to impose the death penalty on any perpetrator no matter how 
egregious the crimes may be.125  As of November 2009, the ECCC had 
only indicted five people, three of whom were convicted and awarded 
life sentences.126 
1.  Role of the Victim 
During the course of the proceedings within the ECCC, the role of 
the victim is crucial.127  A victim is: 
defined as any person or legal entity who has suffered from physical, 
psychological, or material harm as a direct consequence of the crimes 
committed in Cambodia by the Democratic Kampuchea regime 
between April 17, 1975, and January 6, 1979, that are under the 
jurisdiction of the ECCC.128 
                                                          
124.  Law of ECCC, supra note 94, art. 39. 
125.  Seth Mydans, Khmer Rouge Tribunal Enters Final Phase, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/24/world/asia/24cambo.html.  
126.  Id. In total the ECCC has adjudicated Case 001, Case 002, and Cases 003 
and 004. For a brief overview of each of the cases see, ECCC at a Glance, 
EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA (Apr. 2014), 
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/ECCC%20at%20a%20Glance%20-
%20EN%20-%20April%202014_FINAL.pdf.   
127.  See Victims Support Section, supra note 102. Victims have the 
fundamental role of submitting complaints to Co-Prosecutors, “who take the interests 
of Victims into account when considering whether to initiate an investigation or a 
prosecution.” Id. Victims also have the ability to join Civil Parties and seek collective 
and moral reparations. Id. 
128.  Victims Participation, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURT OF 
CAMBODIA, https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/victims-support/participation (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2018). “Anyone who has suffered from physical, psychological, or material 
harm as a direct consequence of the crimes committed in Cambodia by the Democratic 
Kampuchea regime between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979 is considered to be a 
Victim by the ECCC. For example: if you were detained or tortured; if you suffered 
from forced starvation; if you were forced to leave your home and to work hard labor 
against your will; if your parents, grandparents, or other family members were killed, 
abducted, detained, or tortured; if you lost your house, your rice fields, your animals, 
or other property, you may be considered a Victim.” Id.   
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One reason behind the necessity of the victim’s role during the process 
is based upon the concept that the ECCC is an important vehicle for 
those affected by the genocide to come to terms with the traumatic 
events they endured from the atrocities the Khmer Rouge committed.129  
Neth Pheaktra, an ECCC spokesperson, emphasized the importance of 
the ECCC for the victims stating, “The tribunal facilitates reconciliation 
and at the same time provides an opportunity for Cambodians to come 
to terms with their history.”130 
2.  Rights Granted to the Accused 
The procedure that the ECCC follows during the course of the trial 
is all delineated and dictated by the Internal Rules of the ECCC.  Unlike 
the Gacaca courts of Rwanda, the ECCC is grounded in the tenets of 
international law and, therefore, the rights of the accused are factored 
into procedure far more heavily.131  Aside from the accused having a 
right to counsel, the Internal Rules provide guidance for the accused to 
have the right to be informed of their charges, the right to confront and 
question their accusers, a set time for the accused to prepare their case, 
and provisions against unwarranted searches and seizures.132  
Furthermore, “[G]acaca courts have no procedures governing what 
evidence is admissible or inadmissible, who has the burden of proving 
that a person committed a crime, and what standard should be used to 
determine guilt.”133  Within the Internal Rules for the ECCC, there are 
specific rules for the intake of evidence.134  Additionally, the judiciary 
                                                          
129.  See Isabelle Chan, Rethinking Transitional Justice: Cambodia, Genocide, 
and a Victim-Centered Model, INT’L STUD. HON. PROJ. 3, 30 (2006). 
130.  Sun Narin, No justice without remembering, DEV. & COOPERATION (Mar. 
4, 2017), https://www.dandc.eu/en/article/legacy-khmer-rouge-still-haunts-
cambodia.  
131.  Michael G. Karnavas, Bringing Domestic Cambodian Cases Into 
Compliance With International Standards, 1 CAMBODIA L. & POL’Y J. 45, 47 (2014).  
132.  See ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 98.  
133.  Justice Compromised: The Legacy of Rwanda’s Community-Based 
Gacaca Courts, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 31, 2011), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/05/31/justice-compromised/legacy-rwandas-
community-based-gacaca-courts.  
134.  ECCC Internal Rules, supra note 98, Rule 87.  
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is able to reject evidence for being irrelevant or repetitious, or being 
impossible to obtain within a reasonable time.135 
However, one of the most stark and striking differences between 
the Gacaca courts and the ECCC within procedure is the manner in 
which judiciary matters are conducted.  Unlike the Gacaca courts, 
which rely on having a judiciary comprised solely of individuals from 
the community at large,136 the ECCC judiciary is a combination of 
Cambodian and international judges that were nominated by the United 
Nations Secretary-General, and approved by the Cambodian Supreme 
Council of the Magistracy.137  This method was created so the judiciary 
would have less personal attachment to the cases and the ability to focus 
solely on the law.138  Furthermore, the ECCC appeal process is more 
traditional than the Gacaca court.  Within the ECCC process, there are 
only two grounds for appeal to the Supreme Court Chamber: “an error 
on a question of law invalidating the judgment or decision, or an error 
of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.”139 
3.  Deficiencies of the ECCC 
Although the ECCC may be rooted in international law, and have 
more provisions preventing corruption and protecting the accused, the 
process has still faced criticism from the international community.140  
First, there have been significant criticisms in how Cases 003 and 004 
were completed. Case 003 involves the actions of the former Khmer 
Rouge army commanders Meas Muth and Sou Met who allegedly were 
involved in the supervision of transportations, and subsequent arrests of 
prisoners to the S-21 prison.141  The controversy within this case arose 
                                                          
135.  Id.  
136.  Chakravarty, supra note 47, at 132. 
137.  Int’l Bar Ass’n, Safeguarding Judicial Independence in Mixed Tribunals, 
at 19 (Sept. 2011), https://law.vanderbilt.edu/files/archive/Cambodia-report-(Sept-
2011).pdf.  
138.  See id. at 13. 
139.  Id. at 71. Additionally, a decision made within the Chamber’s discretion 
may be subject to immediate appeal if the decision was based on a “discernable error,” 
resulting in prejudice to the appellant. Id.  
140.  Id. 
141.  Open Soc’y Just. Initiative, Recent Developments at the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, at 15 (June 2011), 
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when Andrew Cayley, the International Co-Prosecutor in the case, 
openly challenged the Co-Investigating Judges for the premature 
dismissal of the case insinuating that they were attempting to “bury” the 
case.142  In addition to Mr. Cayley’s statement, multiple judges resigned 
from their positions in what seemed to be a response to the actions taken 
regarding Case 003 and Case 004.143  Significantly, in October 2011, 
German Co-Investigating Judge Siegfried Blunk resigned over the 
Cambodian government’s remarks opposing further prosecutions 
within these cases because it was “undermining his position and calling 
into doubt his ability to act independently.”144 
Not long after the resignation of Justice Blunk, Swiss Judge 
Laurent Kasper-Ansermet resigned unexpectedly as well.145  This 
casted even more doubt on the courts independent ability to investigate 
and pursue charges against aging and ailing Khmer Rouge leaders.146  
Specifically, Case 004 involved three mid-level Khmer Rouge 
commanders: Im Chaem, Ta Ann, and Ta Tith.147  These three 
commanders were in charge of a forced labor camp, which forced 
people to create a massive irrigation project, and oversaw massacres of 
workers within the camp.148  Since the events of the Khmer Rouge, Ta 
Tith has established himself in Cambodia as a successful entrepreneur, 
                                                          
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/cambodia-eccc-
20110614.pdf.  
142.  Sovan My, Cambodia war crimes judge threatens suit against prosecutor, 
LEARNING-TEACHING SOURCES (May 13, 2011), http://ltsources.blogspot.com/ 
2011/05/cambodia-war-crimes-judge-threatens.html.  
143.  Judge Resigns KR Court Over Gov’t Pressure, THE CAMBODIA DAILY 
(Oct. 11, 2011), https://www.cambodiadaily.com/archives/judge-resigns-kr-court-
over-govt-pressure-104822/; see also Press Release by the International Co-
Investigating Judge, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, 
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/press-release-international-reserve-co-
investigating-judge (last visited Mar. 25, 2018).  
144.  Tallyn Gray, Comment, Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Trials in 2012 
in review: Will the Court survive 2013?, 2 WESTMINSTER L. REV. (2012).  
145.  Press Release by the International Co-Investigating Judge, supra note 
143.  
146.  Id.  
147.  Jared Ferrie, Khmer Rouge crimes in legal limbo, THE NATIONAL (last 
updated July 24, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.thenational.ae/world/southeast-
asia/khmer-rouge-crimes-in-legal-limbo?pageCount=0. 
148.  Id.  
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and Im Chaem can now be found in Cambodia’s Anlong Veng District 
as a commune chief, which adds more foundation for concerns of 
political pressure to drop the charges or suspend their hearings.149 
Additional criticisms have been raised over the financial aspects of 
the ECCC. From 2006 to 2016, $293 million dollars were spent on the 
ECCC, with Cambodia contributing approximately $41.5 million 
dollars (approximately 14% of the total finances).150  The United 
Nations contributed the remaining $251.5 million.151 This disparity 
continued to be apparent when analyzing the financial contributions 
made in certain years. By 2014, one case had come to full term, but the 
international community had expended over $200 million on the 
ECCC.152  Additionally, the international community has accused the 
Cambodian government of withholding funding to prevent prosecuting 
of more Khmer Rouge Leaders.153  In fact, government workers, who 
are supposed to be paid by the Cambodian government, have repeatedly 
requested their salaries to be paid and went on strike in 2013.154 
Neither the Gacaca nor the ECCC are infallible.  However, to 
determine if either of these courts are providing and fostering 
transitional justice, the successes and the failures of both courts must 
be examined. 
                                                          
149.  Id. 
150.  ECCC Financial Outlook as of 31 October 2017, EXTRAORDINARY 
CHAMBER IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, 
https://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/ECCC%20Contribution%20Data%20as
%20at%2031%20October%202017.pdf (Cambodia is the second largest contributor 
to the ECCC behind Japan’s $69.8 million contribution). 
151.  Id. 
152.  Charlie Campbell, Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Trials Are a Shocking 
Failure, TIME (Feb. 13, 2014), http://time.com/6997/cambodias-khmer-rouge-trials-
are-a-shocking-failure/.  
153.  Cambodia: Government Obstructs Khmer Rouge Court, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Sept. 5, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/print/250989.  
154.  Id.  
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III. SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE GACACA AND THE 
EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBER IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA. 
A.  Success of the Gacaca Court 
When analyzing the successes and failures of the Gacaca and the 
ECCC we must bear in mind that the focus of analysis is which system 
best forwards the tenets of transitional justice. The four tenets of 
transitional justice, as established in international human rights law, 
are: 
[1] the State obligation to investigate and prosecute alleged 
perpetrators of gross violations of human rights and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, including sexual 
violence, and to punish those found guilty; [2] the right to know the 
truth about past abuses and the fate of disappeared persons; [3] the 
right to reparations for victims of gross violations of human rights 
and serious violations of international humanitarian law; and [4] the 
State obligation to prevent, through different measures, the 
reoccurrence of such atrocities in the future.155 
Within the Gacaca system, there has been some notable success in 
the Rwandan people’s ability to create positive working steps towards 
healing and reconciliation.  Many in Rwanda have expressed the 
Gacaca has allowed communities to move forward not only through the 
process of bringing perpetrators to justice,156 but has allowed families 
to discover the truth behind their loved ones’ deaths.157  Through this 
process, the environment for transition and reconciliation is developed 
as it allows victims to learn the truth about what happened to their loved 
ones, provides a sense of closure, and allows perpetrators to have the 
ability to confess their crimes, which leads to healing and transition.158  
Furthermore, the Gacaca, regardless of the critiques, has been able to 
provide Rwandans the ability to adjudicate far more accused. 
                                                          
155.  Transitional Justice and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, at 5, U.N. 
Doc. HR/PUB/13/5 (2014).  
156.  See Gabisirege, S. & Babalola, S., Perceptions About the Gacaca Law in 
Rwanda: Evidence from a Multi-Method Study, Rwanda Ministry of Justice (Apr. 
2001), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACN606.pdf. 
157.  See Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide, supra note 35.  
158.   Id. 
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B.  Success of the Extraordinary Chambers 
Although there have been a host of critiques and issues with the 
results of the ECCC since its inception, there have been some 
noteworthy successes generated from the existence of the ECCC.  One 
such success is the ECCC created a common history of the atrocities in 
Cambodia.  However, scholars have noted many individuals within 
Cambodia are unaware of the extent of the Khmer Rouge’s atrocities.159  
This unawareness is a result of the research conducted, which was taken 
by non-Cambodians using English and, therefore, not accessible to 
most Cambodian people.160  This unawareness is exacerbated because, 
since 1999, Cambodian schools have not taught the history of the 
Khmer Rouge.161 
Through the transparency the ECCC provides, the people of 
Cambodia are able to hear first-hand from those involved, exactly what 
took place during the Khmer Rouge’s regime. From 2009 to 2014, 
between live and video mediums, over 390,000 people have viewed the 
proceedings of the ECCC.162  This display of interaction with the 
general populous furthers the ability of the ECCC to reach the 
Cambodian people in a manner that will allow them to assimilate and 
acknowledge the information about the dark time in their history.  
Similar to the Gacaca, this allows the people to be directly involved. 
Another success is the ability to end impunity within Cambodia. 
Even though only five indictments have resulted from the ECCC 
proceedings, the ECCC has created an opportunity for the Cambodian 
people to hold some perpetrators accountable for the gross human rights 
violations.163  However, one of the strongest successes is the ability to 
                                                          
159.  Melanie Klinkner, Forensic Science for Cambodian Justice, 2 INT’L J. 
TRANSNAT’L JUST. 227, 238, 241–42 (2008). 
160.  Id. at 238. 
161. See Erika Kinetz, In Cambodia, a Clash Over History of the Khmer Rouge, 
WASH. POST (May 8, 2007) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/05/07/AR2007050701870.html. 
162.  See ECCC at a Glance, supra note 126.   
163.  See Mary Wood, Tribunal for Khmer Rouge War Criminals May Be Last 
Chance to End Cambodia’s “Culture of Impunity,” U. VA. SCH. LAW (Apr. 7, 2004), 
http://content.law.virginia.edu/news/2004_spr/cambodia.htm.  
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develop and foster a culture of the rule of law.164  The ECCC has 
provided training through the Legacy Program and the training of 
Cambodian lawyers by the ECCC.165  These efforts have fostered an 
environment of knowledge sharing in which various projects and non-
governmental organizations have traveled to Cambodia to impart their 
legal knowledge to the legal staff in Cambodia.166  Through this 
practice and training, the culture of law can expand as the torch of legal 
knowledge is spread like wildfire throughout the legal community in 
Cambodia which effects not just structural but transitional justice 
changes as well. 
C.  Failures of the Gacaca Court 
Turning towards the other side of the coin, we must analyze the 
failures of both courts to properly ascertain their place in forwarding 
transitional justice.  The massive lack of rights for the accused and the 
structural deficiencies within the Gacaca system lead to increased 
chances for corruption, which increases the possibility of impeding 
transitional justice.  Additionally, the Gacaca courts have been shown 
to have a 20% acquittal rate.167  Analysts assert this rate is an indicator 
the cases that are presented to the Gacaca are not well structured, 
potentially allowing those that have committed atrocities to go free.168  
Further, since the Gacaca courts do not rely on traditional evidence and 
primarily on witness testimony, the duration from the alleged crime to 
the subsequent trial may skew a witness’s memory; thus, possibly 
skewing the entire trial process.169 
Another failure scholars have noted is the government’s decision to 
decline prosecuting soldiers of the current ruling party, the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (“RPF”).170  The RPF soldiers that ended the genocide 
                                                          
164.  Helen Horsington, The Cambodian Khmer Rouge Tribunal: The Promise 
of a Hybrid Tribunal, 5 MELB. J. INT’L L. 462, 480 (2004). 
165.  Id. 
166.  Id.  
167.  Vasagar, supra note 67. 
168.  Id. 
169.  Id.  
170.  Rwanda: Justice After Genocide – 20 Years On, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 
28, 2014, 6:02 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/28/rwanda-justice-after-
genocide-20-years.   
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in July 1994 killed thousands of combatants and non-combatants.171 
However, the law was amended in 2004 to exclude these crimes from 
being discussed within the Gacaca proceedings.172  As a result, long-
term reconciliation will be impaired until the Rwandan government 
provides the Gacaca court the ability to openly discuss the entire history 
of atrocities. 
D.  Failures of the Extraordinary Chambers 
Turning towards the ECCC, the major failures that are most notably 
critiqued are the egregiously slow process of indicting, convicting only 
five offenders through the process as well as the fear that the 
Cambodian government determines who will be tried.173  Looking at 
these failures through the transitional justice lens, if the path to 
transitional justice is to allow individual closure and healing, the 
Cambodian government cannot inject its will into the proceedings of 
the ECCC.  Given the underdeveloped ability to reach low-level 
offenders, the ECCC is not satisfying the tenant of direct justice to the 
Cambodian people.  Although the foundation of the ECCC is built upon 
the strength of international law, if that law is not being effectuated in 
a manner that provides closure or unity to the Cambodian people in their 
reconciliation, then the benefits of transitional justice will be stifled. 
IV. APPLICATION FOR FUTURE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 
After analyzing all the factors between the Gacaca and ECCC the 
question then must be asked, which system is a better model in 
forwarding transitional justice?  This answer directly depends on what 
the state and victims need.  If we are seeking a transitional justice 
system that focuses on justice, then we analyze which system has 
brought more accused to justice or punishment for their crimes, 
                                                          
171.  The Rwandan Patriotic Front, HUM. RTS. WATCH, 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-03.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 
2018).  
172.  Rwanda: Mixed Legacy for Community-Based Genocide Courts, supra 
note 74. 
173.  See generally Tom Fawthrop, Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge Tribunal: 
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allowing victims to gain closure.  Given the simple fact that the ECCC 
has only indicted and convicted five people, while the Gacaca has heard 
1.2 million cases throughout 12,000 community-based courts, on paper 
the Gacaca claims victory.174  However, this focus almost becomes a 
numbers game, the more trials, the more accused being punished, the 
more justice dispensed, which is not always inherently true. 
When we turn to the peace side of the dichotomy the discussion 
becomes more convoluted.  When looking at transitional justice in this 
instance, we are not just looking at the healing and reconciliation of the 
communities at large,175 but rather the impact of lasting peace with the 
transitioning regime.176  Both the Rwandan and Cambodian 
government in some manner have instituted a policy or action that calls 
into question the legitimacy of true reconciliation and development of 
closure.  Both governments have created amnesties, which prevent the 
court from punishing certain groups.  At the point that takes place, true 
peace through transitional reconciliation is limited because the essence 
of healing and peace requires full disclosure and admittance.  Since both 
systems can be shown to have taken a stance of interjection through the 
government, we must look to other factors to ascertain an answer. 
One of the largest differences between the Gacaca and ECCC is 
that the ECCC has developed a firm foundation for advocating victims’ 
rights against perpetrators in both a criminal and civil manner. The most 
significant difference is that the healing and peace is not just generated 
from the testimony presented by those on trial, or the victims sharing 
their sorrow, but the support provided during and after the trial via the 
VSS.177  Both the Gacaca and ECCC allow victims and accused to share 
and testify their experiences to gain closure or reconciliation. 
However, the ECCC is the only model that provides counseling and 
psychological support to victims dealing with the difficult process.  
Although truth can bring some closure, the price of that truth can come 
                                                          
174.  Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide, supra note 35.  
175.  David Mendeloff, Trauma and Vengeance: Assessing the Psychological 
and Emotional Effects of Post-Conflict Justice, 31(3) HUM. RTS. Q. 592, 593 (2009).  
176.  See Cyanne E. Loyle, Transitional Injustice: Subverting Justice in 
Transition and Postconflict Societies, 15 J. HUM. RTS. 126 (2016).  
177.  See Laura McGrew, Performance and Perception: The Impact of the 
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with injuries that will require a lifetime of mental support and care.  The 
ECCC has at least established the proper foundation to provide victims 
with the tools necessary to take what they hear at the proceedings and 
cope properly with professional help along the way.  Just hearing words 
is not enough, true peace requires the ability to understand how to deal 
with the emotional struggle, and channel that pain in a positive manner.  
Although the quantity is clearly in the Gacaca’s favor, the ECCC 
provides more resources to forward the process with the support 
necessary to make effective transitional change. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Depeche Mode’s “The Policy of Truth,” mentioned at the 
beginning of this Article was not singing about either the atrocities in 
Rwanda or Cambodia, there are messages in the single that reflect the 
process both nations have devised to reconcile very dark times in their 
history.  “Never again is what you swore the time before.”178  After the 
Holocaust, the mantra regarding genocide became “Never Again.”  Yet, 
the world has suffered genocide after genocide since the closure of 
those concentration camps. Depeche Mode also said, “[Y]ou will see 
your problems multiply, if you continually decide to faithfully pursue 
the policy of truth.”179  Both the Gacaca and ECCC have created their 
own host of critiques and problems.  Nevertheless, both systems have 
recognized some of their structural and practical issues. The ECCC, 
although lacking in numbers of those indicted, has made headway in a 
variety of facets reconciling individual victims in Cambodia. Through 
victim support, production of a legal culture rooted in international law, 
and establishment of a common history, the ECCC has given people a 
means to begin to recognize and transition from the days of the Khmer 
Rouge. 
For the accused who testify, “[I]t’s too late to change events, it’s 
time to face the consequence for delivering the proof in the policy of 
truth.”180 This is the essence of what transitional justice is.  Recognizing 
and accepting past atrocities is critical for the community and nation as 
a whole to heal and move forward. Both systems have forwarded this 
                                                          
178.  Policy Of Truth, supra note 1.   
179.  Id. 
180.  Id. 
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concept to some extent.  Each system reveals how the international 
community can support both victims and governments. Through this, 
we can finally help those affected by the tragedy of genocide and war 
crimes by instituting the best institutions that allow healing, peaceful 
transition, and reconciliation. 
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